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and Moral Conflict 
While most pragmatists view themselves as pluralists of one sort or another, 
Talisse and Aikin (hereafter "T&A") argue that the two views are, in fact, "not 
compatible" (T&A, p. 2). However, while their charge may be true of the types 
of pluralism that they consider, these pluralisms all presuppose a type of realism 
about value that the pragmatic pluralist need not accept. In what follows, I'll 
argue that the 'non-realist' account of value that one finds in James underwrites a 
type of pluralism that is both substantial and compatible with pragmatism. 
When T&A argue for the incompatibility of pragmatism and pluralism, they 
have in mind mainly what they call "deep pluralism" which offers "an ontological 
account of the persistence of moral dispute" (p. 102), and as they put it: 
According to the ontological account, the moral facts 
are themselves in conflict; consequently there is a number 
of true moral propositions that nonetheless do not form 
a consistent set. Hence even a cognitively perfect being 
... must confront moral conflict. Given this, to expect 
moral consensus among mere humans is unreasonable. 
(P. 102) 
Deep pluralism ... is generally the prescriptive outcome 
of a strong ontological account of value conflict. Given 
that conflict is interminable and built into the very fabric 
of moral reality, one must adopt a kind of agonistic 
attitude toward all values, where there could be no 
moral reason to adopt any view over another. That is, 
the deep pluralist lives in a world where conflicts among 
goods are arational and consequently often violent, and 
the only prescription could be to secure or protect one's 
own values, (p. 103) 
T&A argue that pragmatists can't be deep pluralists of this sort because such 
deep pluralism treats each conflicting viewpoint as "static and perfect" and thus 
not subject to criticism or correction (T&A, p. 109). Deep pluralism is thus in 
conflict with pragmatist commitments to falibilism and the importance of 
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inquiry. 
T&A consider another type of pluralism with which pragmatism is 
compatible, namely, the 'shallow' pluralism that takes disagreement over values 
to have an epistemic rather than ontological explanation. There may be facts of 
the matter relating to moral disagreements, but neither party in moral dispute 
might be subject to criticism because the questions are so complex that human 
beings might not ever be capable of settling them. T&A, however, consider such 
a view to be "pluralism in name only", since the kind of pluralism it endorses 
(which includes a monism about the moral facts) could be accepted by writers 
such as Plato and Descartes, neither of whom should count as pluralists (p. 111). 
Consequently, if shallow pluralism is the only kind of pluralism that the 
pragmatist can endorse, then pragmatists are not 'really' pluralists at all. 
However the dilemma offered between deep and shallow pluralism1 is one 
that the pragmatist need not accept. Indeed, given pragmatism's tendency to tie 
together epistemic and ontological questions, it should not be surprising that a 
pragmatist might seek a way of understanding the persistence of moral 
disagreement that is neither purely epistemic nor purely ontological. Indeed, 
James's pluralism is not only compatible with his pragmatism, but also 
instructively different from the varieties of pluralism that T&A consider. In what 
follows, I'll outline what I take to be some of the main features of a Jamesian 
story about value,2 and while I won't defend the view in any detail, I hope to 
show how a Jamesian approach to moral disagreement is different from the more 
traditional epistemic or ontological explanation mentioned above. 
First of all, for James, values are produced by our practice of valuing, and this 
'constructivist' assumption behind James' pluralism, contrasts sharply with both 
the "unabashed moral realism" of the deep pluralist (p. 107) and the implicit 
moral realism of the shallow pluralist. In spite of this comparative lack of realism 
about value, James still insists that our values purport to be "objective". While 
values are constructed out of our valuations, they are meant to be more than 
simply expressions of our preferences. Value judgments aspire to be truth-apt, 
and because of this, any set of valuations can be criticized for being inconsistent 
(either with other valuations or our beliefs about the world). Further, an ethical 
system, coherent or not, will not reach a stable equilibrium if the people 
embodying it are not satisfied living the life that it dictates. An adequate ethical 
theory must fit the grain of our "ethical experience". Valuations must be brought 
into "wide" reflective equilibrium, and they only succeed in being true if they 
eventually do so. 
While a valuation only becomes true by becoming part of a stable 
equilibrium, there is no guarantee that any particular set of valuations has a single 
equilibrium accessible to it. It may be that there is a single set of values that our 
current valuations would inevitably lead to if its inconsistencies were removed, 
but it is equally possible that (1) there is no equilibrium available to our current 
set of valuations,3 or (2) there are many such equilibria available. This latter 
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possibility is true both because there may be multiple starting points (different 
individuals or cultures may start with different sets of valuations), and because 
there may be multiple, equally good, ways to make a single set of starting 
valuations consistent. Consistency may put severe constraints on what possible 
sets of valuations can truly be said to reflect values, but there is no guarantee that 
there need only be just one set of consistent valuations. The Jamesian pragmatist 
is thus committed to a type of "meta-ethical fallibilism". We are practically 
committed to reaching an equilibrium for our valuations, but there is no 
guarantee that we (or anyone else) will do so. Our faith in the existence of any 
such equilibria is, in James's terms, a "will to believe" option.4 
The process of constructing values out of valuation becomes considerably 
harder if one believes, as James does, that values need to be consistent within a 
valuing community. A single, completely isolated individual could produce values 
simply by finding an equilibrium involving his own demands, but such a "moral 
solitude"5 changes radically when other agents are added to the scene. One could 
have a type of "twin solitude" if the two agents didn't take any interest in each 
other (and didn't recognize each other as moral agents at all), but barring that, 
recognition and interaction involves trying to bring the combined set of demands 
into equilibrium.6 That is to say, members of a single community can't 
individually reach different equilibria, since the presence of alternatives 
disequilibriates the whole. When there is a conflict between alternative ways of 
making things consistent, it is not that both are adequate, but rather that, in the 
face of each other, neither are. 
Finally, for James, humans are "plastic" in the sense that their demands and 
preferences can be partially shaped by the environment that they are brought up 
in. Consequently, a set of possible values that may go against the grain for one 
group may be adopted quite naturally by another. This fact may make pluralism 
about values considerably more intractable than simple pluralism about 
theoretical matters. For the theoretical pluralist, the world has a (comparatively) 
fixed grain that alternative theories must all match. Rival theories are just 
different ways of describing the same thing. By contrast, for the practical 
pluralist, an important part of the world's grain shapes itself to fit the theories, so 
two possibly adequate theories need not be, as it were, "practically equivalent."7 
The "direction of fit" between values and the world goes two ways. A system of 
values must be rejected if it clashes too deeply with our demands, but our 
demands can, to a certain extent, be molded to fit the system. 
This is only to highlight a few aspects of what I take to be a Jamesian view, 
and I won't present or defend it here in more detail,8 but this should be enough 
to show how, whatever other faults it may have, a Jamesian moral pluralism is 
neither deep nor shallow in T&A's suggested sense. 
First of all, unlike the deep pluralist, the Jamesian pluralist does not offer an 
ontological account of value that allows that there could be conflicting moral 
truths. If two valuations conflict, at least one of them must fail to be true. This 
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does not however, entail the sort of monism that leaves the pragmatist with only 
a "shallow" pluralism that explains the conflict in values as being merely 
"epistemic". This is because, while conflicting valuations cannot both be true, 
they can both be in a position to become true. That is to say, there may be two 
possible equilibria for our collective moral practice, and each one, if actualized, 
would make true one of the conflicting valuations. However, since only one of 
the possible equilibria can be made actual, the conflicting valuations can't both 
be true. 
Even if we reach a stable community-wide equilibrium, we can recognize 
that there might have been other sets of values that could have been true, though 
possibly not true for us. As mentioned above, human plasticity allows value- 
systems to shape us in a way that reduces the "pinch" between our inclinations 
and what we ought to do. This gives us another sense in which competing value 
systems really are incompatible: they are not just alternative perspectives on a 
shared world, because each may require, to reach equilibrium, that we be shaped 
in different ways. 
The Jamesian pluralist is thus committed to the possibility of their being no 
pre-existing fact of the matter when we are faced with some moral disputes, and 
thus that there may be no purely reason- based ways to settle some moral 
disputes, with consensus only being reachable by one party "converting" the 
other. However, it isn't clear why such a bullet cannot be bitten since, unlike 
T&A's deep pluralist, the pragmatist need not take any actual moral systems to 
be immune from rational criticism. Given that one cannot be sure, indeed given 
that we have good reason to doubt, that our own moral views are in equilibrium, 
we still have the sort of openness to others associated with shallow pluralism in 
place. Currently endorsed moral systems may all be inadequate, but each of them 
may emphasize demands that a fully adequate moral system must take account of. 
Consequently, an openness to all of them may be the best policy.9 Something like 
the "agonistic" attitude would only be justified if we could be assured that 
neither party in a moral dispute had an equilibrium accessible to it, and we have 
no reason to make such an assumption. 
It is important to note that this presentation of a Jamesian pluralism is not 
simply a version of the defense that "'pluralism' as pragmatists employ the term 
does not fit in [T&A's] proposed taxonomy" (T&A, p. 112). Unlike the version 
of the retort that T&A consider, which just takes "pluralism" to be a blanket 
term for various virtues such as "experimentalism, inclusion, openness, and 
contextualism", the Jamesian moral pluralism proposed here itself suggests what 
is problematic with the sort of deep and shallow pluralisms that T&A take to 
dominate the literature. The sort of pragmatic pluralism outlined above suggests 
that both sides of the deep/shallow divide are undermotivated, in that neither 
the purely ontological nor the purely epistemic explanation can be taken to 
follow from the seemingly intractable nature of disagreements about value. 
The fact that there is comparatively blameless disagreement may be a starting 
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point in thinking about ethical conflict. However, both the shallow pluralist 
(who assumes that a consensus must be, in principle, reachable, and the 
explanation of disagreement is just epistemic) and the deep pluralist (who 
assumes that both sides of the dispute represent objective values) make substantial 
assumptions about ethical ontology that the pragmatist does not. The 
disagreement may be merely epistemic, or there may be incompatible quilibria 
accessible, but there is no a priori reason to be assured of either. 
The Jamesian explanation of value conflict is thus a mix of the epistemic and 
ontological. The explanation is ontological in the sense that there may be no 
current fact of the matter that would make one of the disputants mistaken. It is 
"epistemic", in the sense that, for all we know, there may just be one equilibrium 
available to us, and that one of the valuations could never turn out to be true, 
but for all we know, neither might be supportable, or possibly even both. Meta- 
ethical falliblism prevents the Jamesian pluralist from giving firm answers to 
questions about the sorts of facts that lie behind moral disputes. 
In conclusion, while I agree that deep pluralism is inconsistent with 
pragmatism, I also think that the Jamesian framework highlights what is wrong 
with such deep pluralism and the realist framework that it presupposes. 
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NOTES 
1. I'll skip any discussion of modus vivendi pluralism, though given its 
ontological underpinnings, it will suffer from the faults that I will attribute to deep 
pluralism. 
2. Particularly in "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life in James 
1896. Elements of this account are presented and defended in more detail in Jackman 
1998, 2004, and forthcoming. 
3. Of course there will always be sets of merely possible valuations that 
could reach an equilibrium, but sets of merely possible valuations, consistent or not, do 
not produce values. Consequently, the Jamesian is only talking about possible equilibria 
that could realistically grow out of our own valuations. 
4. For a discussion of this, see Jackman 1999, 2004, forthcoming. 
5. James 1896, p. 146. 
6. James 1896, p. 146-7. 
7. This is, in James' terms, one of those areas where we are "makers" 
rather than merely "recorders" of truths. 
8. Though, once again, see Jackman 1998, 1999, 2004, forthcoming. 
9. Further, if all of the current ethical systems are only partial and 
inadequate when viewed globally, then there may be reason to move from one to another 
depending on one's context, since different systems may deal better with different parts of 
our ethical experience. (Compare the sort of pluralism that follows from James's 
instrumentalism about our general theories of the world in his Pragmatism (James 1907)). 
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